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Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole
is Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Barred by
the Eighth Amendment for Juveniles Who Have
Committed Nonhomicide Crimes: Graham v.
Florida
UNITED STATES-CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE
SENTENCING PROCEDURES-The United States Supreme
Court held that the Constitution prohibits sentencing juveniles,
who have committed nonhomicide crimes, to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF GRAHAM
Terrance Jamar Graham was arrested in July of 2003, at the
age of sixteen, for his involvement in a robbery.1 Pursuant to Flor-
ida law, Graham was prosecuted as an adult.2 The maximum sen-
tence Graham could face was life in prison without the possibility
of parole. 3 However, Graham pled guilty and was sentenced to
three years probation and served twelve months in prison.4 While
on probation, Graham was accused again of robbery on December
2, 2004. 5 He was still under the age of eighteen at the time of his
second arrest.
6
On December 13, 2004, an affidavit was filed with the trial court
that alleged that Graham had acted in violation of the terms of his
probation.7 The trial court held hearings in December 2005 and
January 2006 concerning the alleged violations.8 The trial court
found that Graham had indeed violated the terms of his proba-
tion.9 At the sentencing hearing, the minimum possible sentence
was five years, which was requested by his counsel. 10 While the
maximum penalty allowed was life imprisonment, the Florida De-
partment of Corrections suggested a four year sentence, whereas
the state asked that Graham be given a total sentence of forty-five
1. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010). Graham, along with three accom-
plices, attempted to rob a restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
While no money was actually taken from the restaurant, one of Graham's accomplices hit
the manager in the head twice with a metal bar, causing injury. Id.
2. FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b)(2007). "Under Florida law, it is within a prosecutor's
discretion whether to charge 16 and 17-year-olds as adults or juveniles for most felony
crimes." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
3. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018. Graham was charged with a first degree felony, armed
burglary with assault or battery, which had a maximum sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. Id. Also, Graham was charged with a second degree
felony, attempted armed-robbery, which had a maximum sentence of fifteen years impris-
onment. Id.
4. Id. Graham was released from prison on June 25, 2004 because he received credit
for time served while he was awaiting trial. Id.
5. Id. at 2018. On that night, Graham and two accomplices forcibly entered a home
and held the occupants at gunpoint and then locked the occupants in a closet. Id at 2018-
19. Graham was also suspected of another robbery that evening where one of his accom-
plices was shot. Id. at 2019. Graham took the accomplice to the hospital where a police
officer noticed him and thereafter a high speed chase ensued before Graham crashed his
car and was apprehended. Id.
6. Id. Graham was thirty-four days shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of his
arrest. Id.
7. Id.
8. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019.
9. Id. By admitting to fleeing, the trial court reasoned that Graham essentially
acknowledged that he violated the terms of his probation. Id.
10. Id.
Graham v. Florida
years." The trial court judge, however, found Graham to be hope-
less1 2 and gave Graham the maximum sentence of life, plus fifteen
years, without the possibility of parole.13
Graham disputed the sentence by filing a motion with the trial
court asserting a violation of his constitutional rights under the
Eighth Amendment. 14 The time period for the trial court to rule
on the motion lapsed and it was thus denied by operation of law. 15
Graham then appealed to the First District Court of Appeal of
Florida. 16 The court agreed with the trial judge's opinion, finding
Graham incorrigible and ruled that the sentence imposed by the
trial court was not unwarranted due to the nature of his crimes.
17
The Florida Supreme Court denied review and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the constitutional
issue.'8
The issue faced by the Court was whether the Eighth Amend-
ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause makes a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole unconstitu-
tional when given to a minor under the age of eighteen for a non-
homicide offense.' 9 Graham's case, challenging the length of his
sentence, was an issue of first impression.20 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court by a five to three vote 2' and held that a
life sentence under such circumstances without the possibility of
parole, from the outset, is unconstitutional. 22
11. Id. The state recommended thirty years for the armed burglary and fifteen years
for the attempted robbery. Id.
12. Id. at 2020. The trial court judge explained the sentence by stating: "Given your
escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to the Court that you have decided
that this is the way you are going to live your life and that the only thing I can do now is to
try and protect the community from your actions." Id.
13. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020. Graham was sentenced to life for the armed burglary
charge and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery charge. Id. Florida has abol-
ished its parole system, so a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless
he is granted executive clemency. FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2020.





19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
21. Id. at 2017. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, to which Justice
Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined.
22. Id. at 2034. The Court held:
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juve-
nile offender who did not commit a homicide. A State need not guarantee the offender
Fall 2011
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II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION IN GRAHAM
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began by examining
what aspects of a punishment make it cruel and unusual as to be
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 23 One of the main concepts
of the Eighth Amendment is the sentence given should be bal-
anced and appropriate to the crime committed. 24 The case at issue
challenged the sentencing practice as a whole, pertaining to all
persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes under the age of eight-
een.25 Thus, a case-by-case proportionality test would not be ap-
plicable.26 To determine if a life sentence without the possibility of
parole for a juvenile is cruel and unusual, the majority took into
account state sentencing practices.
27
Justice Kennedy first examined state and federal legislation.
28
The results varied as some jurisdictions have enacted legislation
allowing life imprisonment and others have banned it.29 To gain a
clearer picture of the nation's actual consensus on the issue, the
majority researched the sentencing practices in those jurisdictions
that allow juveniles to receive life sentences for nonhomicide of-
fenses.30 The majority found the actual application of such sen-
tences to be rare.31 Through the study of the actual application of
state sentencing practices, Justice Kennedy found that the majori-
ty of courts are actually against it.32
eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with
some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.
Id.
23. Id. at 2021.
24. Id.
25. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
26. Id. at 2023.
27. Id. at 2022.
28. Id. at 2023.
29. Id.
Six jurisdictions do not allow life without parole sentences for any juvenile offenders.
Seven jurisdictions permit life without parole for juvenile offenders, but only for hom-
icide crimes. Thirty-seven States as well as the District of Columbia permit sentenc-
es of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender in some circumstances.
Id.
30. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
31. Id. "[O]nly 11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life without parole sentences
on juvenile nonhomicide offenders-and most of those impose the sentence quite rarely-while
26 States as well as the District of Columbia do not impose them despite apparent statuto-
ry authorization." Id. at 2024.
32. Id. at 2026.
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While the study of actual sentencing practices was beneficial to
the determination of the issue, the majority highlighted the im-
portance of the criminal culpability, actual crime committed, and
length of the sentence as crucial portions of the analysis in deter-
mining if the punishment is cruel and unusual.33 The Court
acknowledged that juveniles are at a greater risk than mature
adults to be influenced by negative behavior, as their minds are
not as developed as adult minds.34 But, juveniles also have the
ability to grow and modify their behavior. 35 The Court recognized
in Roper v. Simmons,36 that minors lack culpability and should not
receive the harshest sentences.37 Justice Kennedy noted that with
the exception of the death penalty, life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is the harshest punishment available. 3
8
The majority contended that there is a lack of penological justi-
fications for sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment when they
have committed a nonhomicide crime. 39 Justice Kennedy argued
that inflicting the most severe punishment was not warranted for
nonhomicide crimes.40 Further, the Court asserted that the same
qualities possessed by juveniles that make them less culpable
than adults, also limit the effect of deterrence. 41 Also, while the
trial court found Graham to be incorrigible, the majority found it
impossible to determine if a juvenile's crime shows his true char-
acter or just lack of maturity, thus the Court was unable to justify
categorizing the criminal minor as incapacitated. 42 The final pe-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
36. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Roper involved a juvenile sentenced to death for a murder that
was committed when he was seventeen years old. Roper, 543 U.S. 556. The Supreme
Court held that it was unconstitutional to execute juveniles who were under the age of
eighteen when the offense was committed. Id. at 578.
37. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. "As compared to adults, juveniles have a 'lack of ma-
turity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility'; they 'are more vulnerable or suscep-
tible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure'; and their char-
acters are 'not as well formed."' Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
38. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
39. Id. at 2028. The goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized are legitimate-
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id.
40. Id. at 2027. 'The Court has recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend to
kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious
forms of punishment than are murderers." Id.
41. Id. at 2028-29. "[Juveniles] are less likely to take a possible punishment into con-
sideration when making decisions. This is particularly so when that punishment is rarely
imposed." Id.
42. Id. at 2029. It is difficult to determine if a minor will forever pose a risk to society.
Id. "'It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile of-
fender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
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nological justification was rehabilitation and when a juvenile is
not provided with an opportunity for parole, the majority contend-
ed there is no motive for the juvenile to change.
43
Justice Kennedy did not deny that Graham's conduct warranted
punishment, rather he maintained that Graham may not be a
danger to the community forever and as such, he should have a
chance to eventually reenter society and show maturation and
rehabilitation. 44 Because minors who commit nonhomicide offens-
es do lack certain characteristics that adults possess and there is a
lack of justification for imposing the most severe sentences, the
Court held that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
is a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed upon a juvenile
for a nonhomicide offense. 45 The majority clarified that those who
were under eighteen at the time of their offense, like Graham,
were not promised that they will receive parole; rather, the Court
concluded that the Constitution prohibits courts from inflicting a
life sentence from the beginning.46 Justice Kennedy stated that
Graham and other juveniles are to be given a chance to mend
their ways.
47
B. Chief Justice Robert's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion in judgment
agreeing with the majority's conclusion that Graham's sentence
was unconstitutional, but under a different analysis. 4 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts based his analysis primarily on case law.49 Through
an examination of proportionality, Chief Justice Roberts agreed
that the sentence of life imprisonment violated the Constitution
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."' Id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S.
551, 573).
43. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-2030.
44. Id. at 2030.
45. Id.
46. Id. 'The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted
of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does
forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit
to reenter society." Id.
47. Id.
48. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Roberts stated: "I
agree with the Court that Terrance Graham's sentence of life without parole violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.' Unlike the majority,
however, I see no need to invent a new constitutional rule of dubious provenance in reach-
ing that conclusion." Id.
49. Id. at 2037.
790 Vol. 49
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with regard to Graham's case.50 However, Chief Justice Roberts
disagreed with the majority concerning the blanket rule that
mandates the unconstitutionality of life sentences without the
possibility of parole for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders and in-
stead contended that some juveniles could receive such punish-
ments.51 While this concurring opinion agreed with the decision
concerning Graham, the Chief Justice disagreed with the categori-
cal rule and asserted that there are some crimes where it would be
constitutional to impose a life sentence without possibility of pa-
role.
52
C. Justice Thomas'Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority and contended that
judges and juries within the states should retain the power to im-
pose a life sentence without parole for juvenile offenders. 53 The
dissenting opinion disagreed entirely with the categorical rule im-
posed to protect all juveniles who have committed any offense be-
sides murder.54 Justice Thomas also asserted that the majority
did not sufficiently provide any evidence rationalizing the categor-
ical rule it has applied. 55 First, the dissent addressed the majori-
ty's argument that there was a national consensus against the
application of life sentences for juveniles and concluded the oppo-
site, as juveniles are permitted to be tried as adults and thus can
50. Id. at 2036. Justice Roberts explained, "Graham's juvenile status-together with the
nature of his criminal conduct and the extraordinarily severe punishment imposed-lead me
to conclude that his sentence of life without parole is unconstitutional." Id.
51. Id. at 2038-39. The concurring opinion concludes that case precedence is sufficient
in this area:
[Olur existing precedent already provides a sufficient framework for assessing the
concerns outlined by the majority. Not every juvenile receiving a life sentence will
prevail under this approach. Not every juvenile should. But all will receive the pro-
tection that the Eighth Amendment requires.
Id. at 2039. In making his argument, Justice Roberts relied on some examples of gruesome
crimes committed by juveniles, such as a case involving the brutal beating and rape of an
eight year old girl. Id. at 2041.
52. Id. at 2042. Chief Justice Roberts asserted "[s]ome crimes are so heinous, and some
juvenile offenders so highly culpable, that a sentence of life without parole may be entirely
justified under the Constitution." Id.
53. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined, while
Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and III. Id.
54. Id. at 2046. Justice Thomas noted, "[flor the first time in its history, the Court
declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categori-
cal approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone." Id. Justice Thomas
further asserted that "[n]o reliable limiting principle remains to prevent the Court from
immunizing any class of offenders from the law's third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe
penalties as well." Id.
55. Id. at 2048.
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be sentenced as adults. 56 The rationale for this argument, as Jus-
tice Thomas noted, was based largely on the increasing severity of
punishments for juvenile offenders and the overwhelming majori-
ty of jurisdictions that allow minors to be tried as adults.57 Justice
Thomas maintained that because there may be circumstances
where a juvenile did possess the culpability for a heinous, non-
homicide crime, juries should retain their ability to make the deci-
sion to punish the juvenile as an adult.58
Justice Thomas analyzed the data received from the test show-
ing the rarity of life sentences actually being imposed differently
and concluded that the study merely showed that the majority of
jurisdictions are in agreement that the penalty should be adminis-
tered rarely, not that it should never be given. 59 Justice Thomas
further asserted that the evidence that jurisdictions have enacted
legislation allowing life sentences showed that the people of those
jurisdictions are aware that there may be certain situations in
which the sentence may be warranted; therefore, the sentence is
not cruel and unusual.60 Ultimately, the dissents' issue with the
majority opinion reached by the Court was the blanket constitu-
tional ban on life sentences without parole for juveniles in non-
homicide cases.
61
56. Id. Justice Thomas argued that as because all the states and government allow for
juveniles to be tried as adults under certain circumstances, they may also be punished as
adults. Id. The dissent also provided statistics that show that "[o]nly five States prohibit
juvenile offenders from receiving a life without-parole sentence that could be imposed on an
adult convicted of the same crime." Id. at 2049.
57. Id. at 2050.
58. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2050 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2051. The dissent reasoned, "[t]hat a punishment is rarely imposed demon-
strates nothing more than a general consensus that it should be just that-rarely imposed.
It is not proof that the punishment is one the Nation abhors." Id.
60. Id. To further illustrate his conclusion, Justice Thomas used a recent case in Okla-
homa as an example. Id. Recently, a seventeen year old was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole for attacking and raping a teenage girl. Id. Before this instance, Ok-
lahoma had never utilized the sentence and Justice Thomas concluded that while the sen-
tence was rare, it was to be used when those rare circumstances arise. Id.
61. Id. at 2054. Justice Thomas poses the main issue of the case as:
Our society tends to treat the average juvenile as less culpable than the average
adult. But the question here does not involve the average juvenile. The question, in-
stead, is whether the Constitution prohibits judges and juries from ever concluding
that an offender under the age of 18 has demonstrated sufficient depravity and incor-
rigibility to warrant his permanent incarceration.
Vol. 49792
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D. Justice Steven's Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens briefly responded to Justice Thomas's dissent
through a concurring opinion. 62 Through the concurrence, Justice
Stevens argued that while the Court may not have found an issue
with certain sentences being cruel and unusual, society is continu-
ously changing.
63
E. Justice Alito's Dissention Opinion
Finally, Justice Alito further dissented from the majority opin-
ion to make two brief points.64 Justice Alito noted that the Court's
holding on the ban of life sentences for juveniles does not affect
term of years punishments from still being imposed on juveniles. 65
Lastly, Justice Alito refused to come to a conclusion regarding the
proportionality issue, as he found that the issue was not before the
Court in this case.
66
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND PRECEDENT
LEADING TO GRAHAM
A. Weems v. United States
In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that
there is a proportionality requirement for criminal penalties; thus,
a punishment must be proportionate to the offense in order to not
be cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 67 The Court
assessed the proportionality of sentences through either a case-by-
case approach, or a categorical rule approach, in determining
whether a punishment is unconstitutionally excessive. 68  The
62. Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor
joined. Id.
63. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens elaborated
that "[p]unishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one time may, in the light of
reason and experience, be found cruel and unusual at a later time; unless we are to aban-
don the moral commitment embodied in the Eighth Amendment, proportionality review
must never become effectively obsolete." Id.
64. Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). "[lit is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
68. Id. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment "does not require a strict proportionality between crime and sentence"
but rather "forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime."); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that life without the possibility of
parole was unconstitutional for the defendant's seventh nonviolent felony).
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Court has limited categorical rules to cases restricting the imposi-
tion of the death penalty, limiting sentences based on either the
type of crime or the characteristics of the accused
69
In making categorical rules for the implication of the death pen-
alty, the Court has looked to societal standards, sentencing prac-
tices, and penological goals to determine whether the sentence is
excessive and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
70
The language of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unu-
sual punishment has not been defined, and its application must be
interpreted through the established framework discussed in Trop
v. Dulles that looks to the changing standards of society.
71
B. Coker v. Georgia
In Coker v. Georgia, the issue before the Court was whether the
imposition of the death penalty was an excessive and unconstitu-
tional punishment under the Eight Amendment for the crime of
rape.72 The Court held that the death penalty would be cruel and
unusual punishment and unconstitutional when the offender
committed rape. 73 In reaching its conclusion, the Court looked to
the state legislatures to determine how many states allowed the
death penalty for such an offense. 74 The Court also looked to the
actual sentencing practices because juries are the true indication
of society's standards, and the majority found that the results in-
dicate that death is excessive as a punishment for rape of an
adult. 75
69. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
70. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). The Court noted:
[A] punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable con-
tribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the pur-
poseless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of propor-
tion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail the test on either ground.
Furthermore, these Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by
objective factors to the maximum possible extent. To this end, attention must be giv-
en to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence history and precedent, leg-
islative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions
are to be consulted.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
71. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). This Court held that we must look to
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" in decid-
ing whether or not a punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Trop,
356 U.S. at 101.
72. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 594-97.
75. Id. at 596-97.
Vol. 49794
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C. Enmund v. Florida
In Enmund v. Florida, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether it was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment to
impose the death penalty for an offense where the offender did not
commit murder, attempt to commit murder, or intend for a death
to occur. 76 The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional
to impose the death penalty on one who does not kill, attempt to
kill, or intend a killing to take place when merely aiding and abet-
ting a felony.77 In crafting this rule, the Court researched the
prevalence of such sentences. 78 Eight jurisdictions permitted the
death penalty in cases where the offender only played a part in
the robbery in the course of which a killing occurred. 79 The re-
search further showed that juries rarely imposed the death penal-
ty in such cases, and the Court therefore inferred that society re-
jected such a sentence for the defendant's limited involvement.80
Further, the majority found that unless the imposition of the
death penalty contributed to the penological goals of retribution
and deterrence, the sentence was unconstitutional as cruel and
unusual.81 Thus, through findings of the sentencing practices and
the lack of penological goals accomplished, the Court found the
death penalty to be unconstitutional for those who did not actually
commit the murder or intend for that murder to take place.8 2
D. Thompson v. Oklahoma
The Court later faced the issue of whether or not the death pen-
alty was cruel and unusual as a sentence when it is imposed on a
76. 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982). In this case, an elderly couple was robbed and then sub-
sequently murdered. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784. Enmund drove the getaway car and was
convicted for his involvement as an accomplice in the armed burglary and was sentenced to
death. Id. at 785-86.
77. Id. at 797. In concluding the case, the Court noted:
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal culpability must be
limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to
his personal responsibility and moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death to avenge two
killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does
not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets
his just deserts. This is the judgment of most of the legislatures that have recently
addressed the matter, and we have no reason to disagree with that judgment for pur-
poses of construing and applying the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 801.
78. Id. at 789-91.
79. Id. at 792.
80. Id. at 794.




juvenile in the case of Thompson v. Oklahoma.8 3 The Court held
that it was unconstitutional for a juvenile who was under the age
of sixteen, at the time of his offense, to receive the death penalty.8
4
Cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited under the Consti-
tution, which coincidentally does not define what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishments.85 When the punishment would be con-
stitutional for an adult, the Court must look at additional stand-
ards in determining why for the same crime it may be unconstitu-
tional due to the offender's age.8 6 The majority noted that juve-
niles, especially those under the age of sixteen, are treated differ-
ently in society because they are not afforded the same rights as
adults."7 The majority emphasized a minor's lack of development
and sensibility.88 Because of the juvenile's lack of development,
the Court found no support for the traditional justifications for the
death penalty: deterrence and retribution.8 9
E. Atkins v. Virginia
Following Thompson, the Court began to consider the culpabil-
ity of the criminal defendant in considering the constitutionality of
the punishment as was the case in Atkins v. Virginia.90 The issue
before the Court was whether it was constitutional under the
Eighth Amendment to give an individual with an intellectual dis-
ability the death penalty. 91 The Court answered the issue in the
affirmative. 92 In reaching the conclusion, the majority acknowl-
83. 487 U.S. 815, 818 (1988).
84. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
85. Id. at 821.
86. Id. at 824. The defendant in this case was fifteen at the time of the murder. Id. at
819-21. The juvenile actively participated in a heinous murder and was sentenced to death.
Id. at 819.
87. Id. at 824. Among other examples, the Court asserted that fifteen year olds cannot
marry without consent, vote, or even drive. Id.
88. Thompson, 487 U.S at 834. The Court noted:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is
much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.
The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of
an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible
as that of an adult.
Id. at 835.
89. Id. at 836-37.
90. 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
91. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and
capital murder and was given the death penalty. Id. A forensic psychologist labeled Atkins
as "mildly mentally retarded" and determined that he had an I.Q. of 59. Id. at 308-09.
92. Id. at 321.
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edged that adults with intellectual disabilities, like children, have
an impaired sense of moral culpability. 93 The majority also dis-
cussed the apparent national consensus for the prohibition of the
death penalty for a person with an intellectual disability and not-
ed that the standards of punishment may be different for those
with lessened culpability. 94 Additionally, as with the other cases
discussed, the Court found that the penological goals of retribution
and deterrence were not satisfied by sentencing a defendant with
an intellectual disability to death.
95
F. Roper v. Simmons
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court was again faced with the issue
of whether a juvenile under the age of eighteen could receive the
maximum sentence of the death penalty.96 The juvenile, Sim-
mons, petitioned on the ground that his sentence was unconstitu-
tional based on the Court's ruling in Atkins.97 The Supreme Court
of Missouri held in favor of Simmons, finding that the national
consensus concerning juvenile death penalty sentencing practices
was changing98 and therefore, sentenced Simmons to life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole. 99 The Supreme Court
agreed and granted certiorari to create a categorical ban, holding
that the death penalty was prohibited as a sentence for juveniles
under the age of eighteen.100
The Court noted a transition through the years that the nation-
al consensus, as evidenced by sentencing practices, grew stronger
in support of a ban against juvenile death penalty sentences,
which mirrored the consensus against executing those with an
intellectual disability '01 The majority in Roper discussed the dif-
ferences between juveniles and adults in culpability, susceptibil-
ity, and character and found that because of the differences, juve-
niles could never be classified as the worst offenders and receive
93. Id. at 310.
94. Id. at 316.
95. Id. at 319-20.
96. 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005). Simmons committed murder at the age of seventeen and
was sentenced to death at a jury trial. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
97. Id. at 559.
98. Id. at 551. In the case of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) abrogated by
Roper, 543 U.S. 551, the Court held that the death penalty was not prohibited for juveniles
over fifteen but under eighteen years of age. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361.
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60.
100. Id. at 560.
101. Id. at 564.
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the harshest punishment.1 2 The majority relied on scientific data
that indicated that juveniles, with their lack of maturity and re-
sponsibility, often act impulsively, thus showing their diminished
culpability. 10 3 The empirical evidence examined by the majority
showed that juveniles often engage in reckless behavior, are more
susceptible to peer pressure, and do not have fully developed
characters. 10 4 The Court concluded that juveniles were more de-
serving of forgiveness as they were not as morally reprehensible
as adult offenders. 10 5 At the time Roper was decided in 2005, the
Court resentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
0 6
IV. HOW THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN EVALUATION WHETHER IT IS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT FOR A MINOR TO RECEIVE LIFE IN PRISON,
WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE, FOR A NONHOMICIDE
OFFENSE
There is an old expression that says one should not judge a book
by its cover, which implies that appearances may be deceiving.
The majority decision of Graham v. Florida embodies this expres-
sion by holding that a juvenile's actions under the age of eighteen
may be deceiving of the person's true character and his true abil-
ity to change. 0 7 The majority held, as a categorical rule, that it is
unconstitutional for a juvenile to be sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole when they have committed a nonhomicide of-
fense. 08 Justice Kennedy employed a comparative analysis, that
was previously used in determining proportionality issues in
death penalty cases, and found that after studies of society's
standards through sentencing practices, lessened juvenile culpa-
bility, and a lack of penological justifications and concluded that
life sentences for nonhomicide crimes could not be justified. 0 9
102. Id. at 570. The Court noted that there are three general differences between adults
and minors under the age of eighteen. Id. First, juveniles lack maturity and responsibility.
Id. Second, juveniles are more susceptible to outside pressures. Id. Finally, a juvenile's
character is not as formed and juveniles have more ability to change as their characters are
not fixed. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
103. Id. at 569.
104. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
105. Id. at 570.
106. Id. at 560.
107. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.




The issue of lessened culpability for teenagers was discussed at
length in Roper v. Simmons, where the Court concluded that it
was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's proportion-
ality requirements for any juvenile to receive the death penalty.'10
While for many years the Court has noted that death is different,
it has now been realized with Graham that the sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an extremely
harsh punishment for juveniles as it guarantees the same end:
death in jail.111
It was noted by many lawyers after the ruling in Roper v. Sim-
mons that those juveniles who acted impulsively and without ma-
turity now would spend the rest of their days rotting in prisons
without the opportunity for parole."12 For example, what is to be-
come of the fourteen year old boy who was playing video games at
a friend's house and because he did not want to be left alone, he
accompanied a group to a home that was eventually burglarized?
While this burglary occurred he hid behind a chair when a victim
in the home was shot and killed? 1 3 The juvenile in this example
was sentenced to life imprisonment, while the reasoning for him
being present that day was because he did not want to be made
fun of, so he simply tagged along."
4
It is arguable that the mere fact that our punishment process
distinguishes an adult system from a juvenile system shows the
difference in how society views a juvenile offender. 115 Two funda-
mental principles exist for the juvenile system: first, juveniles
have diminished culpability, and second juveniles are more likely
able to be rehabilitated. 116 A juvenile without the opportunity to
ever leave jail alive has no chance to be rehabilitated; thus, the
sentence is against the fundamental goals of the juvenile justice
system.
The majority's rationale for its decision is logical. Justice Ken-
nedy, in writing the majority opinion, followed a similar analysis
employed in cases involving the death penalty where a categorical
ban for a class of people was being requested." 7 The majority be-
110. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
111. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
112. Brianne Ogilvie, Is Life Unfair? What's Next for Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons,
60 BAYLOR L. REV. 293, 295 (2008).
113. Id. at 296-97.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 314.
116. Id.
117. See e.g. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
Fall 2011 799
Duquesne Law Review
gan by determining what the national consensus was in regards to
juvenile life imprisonment sentences imposed for nonhomicide
crimes.118 By researching the various legislative decisions in each
state, the Court could determine current contemporary values. 1 9
While legislation may be an important factor to determine socie-
ty's values, the Court made a further examination of actual sen-
tencing practices to determine how often juveniles were sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for nonhomi-
cide crimes where legislation would have permitted the courts to
do so. 120 The results illustrated that the actual sentencing of ju-
veniles to life imprisonment for nonhomicide cases was rare.
1 21
Then, consistent with other opinions considering categorical
bans, the Court gave consideration to the lessened culpability of a
juvenile defendant.' 22 Teenagers often act impulsively and under
negative pressures from peers. Mistakes made at that young age
should not guarantee their death in prison without a meaningful
opportunity to show a change in their character as they age. The
majority also argued that no penological goals were met and there-
fore available to justify the punishment for a juvenile who did not
commit homicide. 123 The same characteristics that make a juve-
nile less culpable also make deterrence less effective. 24 The other
main penological goal is retribution. The majority did not say that
juveniles should not be punished, but it is argued that juveniles
should not receive such a severe punishment where they will have
all hope lost, as they will receive no opportunity to ever rejoin so-
ciety.1 2
5
Most people have done something or made a decision in their
youth that in hindsight and with the wisdom of age they now re-
gret. The categorical ban created in Graham, that forbids a juve-
nile from being sentenced to life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of parole for nonhomicide offenses, does not guarantee that
the juvenile will be released, but it mandates that from the outset,
they must be given an opportunity to obtain release. 26 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed that in
118. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2023-24.
121. Id. at 2024.
122. Id. at 2026.
123. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
124. Id. at 2028-29.
125. Id. at 2028.
126. Id. at 2034.
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Graham's specific case the sentence of life imprisonment without
parole was unconstitutional as it was disproportionate; however,
the Chief Justice maintained that it should not be a rule for the
entire class of juveniles. 27 The majority opinion's argument fol-
lowed the rationale of the previous decisions that the Court used
when deciding categorical bans for death penalty cases. Children
make mistakes and should be afforded the opportunity to learn
from them.
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas, argued that jurisdic-
tions that have legislation allowing such a punishment should be
allowed to continue. 128 The dissent disagreed that the data used
by the majority showed a consensus. 129 Justice Thomas argued
that the right to impose the sentence is for the jury to determine
and that many juries gave this punishment only for the most hei-
nous of crimes. 130 Justice Thomas noted concern for continued
limiting and categorical bans for even less severe punishments
now that the Court created a categorical ban for an entire class
and for a noncapital crime. 131 The dissent also raised the issue of
distinguishing a juvenile who kills someone and has the requisite
culpability to be deserving of the punishment from a minor who
rapes a child, but lacks sufficient culpability.
132
While this is a very controversial issue, the majority adequately
responded to many of the concerns mentioned. Mainly, it is im-
portant that the majority recognized that a juvenile may never
actually reenter society. 133 The holding in Graham only mandated
that at the initial sentencing, a juvenile who did not commit a
homicide may not receive life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole. 34 The Court acknowledged that it is difficult even
for psychologists to determine when a juvenile is immature or tru-
ly corrupt. 135 States will not have to guarantee eventual free-
dom,' 36 so the concerns of the dissent about those juveniles who
did commit some of the most heinous crimes may not ever leave
jail if they are not rehabilitated or show a change in character.
127. Id. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
128. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
129. Id. at 2051.
130. Id. at 2043.
131. Id. at 2046.
132. Id. at 2055-56.
133. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (majority opinion).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2029 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
136. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
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Finally, while there may be future conflicts as to cases where an
offender may commit an offense at the age of eighteen years and
one day, thus not falling into the protected class, a definitive line
must be drawn. Graham determined that eighteen is the line that
is drawn by society for many purposes to show a distinction be-
tween childhood and adulthood and this categorical rule will also
limit the age to eighteen at the time of the committed act.1 37 Also
the constitutionality of a term of years sentence was never dis-
cussed by the Court. For example, a juvenile sentenced to seventy
years in prison without parole is the functional equivalent of the
unconstitutional life without parole sentence. It will be left to the
states to determine the rehabilitation of juveniles and to deter-
mine if any limits are to be placed on the length of the sentence
before the offender is available for parole. It is likely that in the
future the Court will require juveniles to appeal for certiorari be-
cause of long term sentences, but at this time the ban is limited to
life sentences for nonhomicide crimes. In the end, it is important
for the states to remember that teenagers make mistakes in their
youth and should not lose all chance of hope at a life outside of
prison for a mistake made when they were only seventeen years
old.
Kaitlin Jamiolkowski
137. Id. at 2030 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 574).
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